A murky web of lies

[Today marks the fifth anniversary of the release from HMP Greenock of Abdelbaset Megrahi.  

On this date three years ago he was still alive, to the annoyance of much of the media. However, The Scottish Sun published a long article by Marcello Mega headlined The dossier of doubt over Lockerbie. The following are excerpts from the article, as reproduced on this blog:]

The Scottish Sun today lifts the lid on a top-secret dossier that accuses Scots cops and prosecutors of suppressing seven key areas of evidence that cast doubt on the Lockerbie bomber's conviction.

The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission looked into the evidence against Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi - and found a murky web of lies.

The SCCRC's explosive report suspects the Scots authorities are behind a deliberate cover-up over the trial that saw Megrahi jailed for killing 270 people in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over the Dumfriesshire town.

Now on the second anniversary of cancer-stricken Megrahi's controversial release from a Scots jail, we can reveal the commission has grave concerns over the evidence against the 59-year-old following a multi-million-pound, four-year investigation.

In the dossier - seen by The Scottish Sun - Maltese shopkeeper Tony Gauci, who helped finger Megrahi as the bomber, is described as an "unreliable" witness.

Police are also accused of lying in court while prosecutors - including then Lord Advocate Colin Boyd QC - are suspected of suppressing bombshell evidence that would likely have seen Megrahi walk free.

Last night Robert Black QC, retired Professor of Scots Law at Edinburgh University and the architect of the Lockerbie trial, told how he believes Megrahi is innocent.

Mr Black said: "Megrahi is not the Lockerbie bomber and these revelations further underline that.

"I said after reading the daily transcripts of the evidence at the trial and before the judges delivered their verdict that there was no way Megrahi could be convicted on the evidence presented.

"That the judges did convict him on the flimsiest of evidence, which required several leaps of faith on a number of crucial matters that had not been proven by the Crown, remains a matter of profound concern for all of us."

Mr Black said it was now vital that a top-level public inquiry is held to get to the truth.

He said: "We need strong leadership now. We need to admit publicly that we got it wrong, and set about putting right that injustice." (...)

Seven key flaws

Denied fair trial

The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission says Megrahi WAS denied a fair trial in their damning report.

They said the Crown suppressed from Megrahi's defence team statements showing how much key witness Tony Gauci changed his mind about crucial details over the years.

Maltese shopkeeper Gauci's evidence fingered Megrahi as the man who bought clothes in his shop on the Mediterranean isle that were linked to the suitcase carrying the bomb that blew up Pan Am flight 103.

The SCCRC report says Gauci was an "unreliable" witness but this was not shown to be the case in court.

They said: "The effect of all of these inconsistencies is powerful. The court was left with a distorted and different impression of the witness. In this way Megrahi was denied a fair trial."

Cop lies

The SCCRC found that police said in evidence they first showed Gauci photos of Megrahi on September 14, 1989 - when he had in fact also been shown them on September 8.

The report said: "This was not disclosed to the defence. There is no statement from Gauci produced, no police witness statements produced."

The SCCRC said if Gauci had been shown Megrahi's pic six days before he picked him out as resembling the buyer at his shop, then that ID was totally undermined.

Diary dispute

In its report, the SCCRC challenges the integrity of evidence given by retired Strathclyde DCI Harry Bell, who had a close bond with Gauci.

The commission found that events recorded in Bell's diaries didn't always match what he said in evidence.

The commission noted that Bell claimed the Megrahi photo shown to Gauci on September 14, 1989, was the first one. This was not true.

It also reveals Bell, DC John Crawford, a retired Lothian and Borders cop, and an FBI agent all made statements claiming that Gauci had talked of a "striking similarity" between Megrahi and the buyer.

But Maltese officers revealed Gauci was unsure, was coached and told to age the photos by ten to 15 years.

The report says: "This is different to DCI Bell's evidence at trial. It also implies the witness is unclear."

Cash for answers

The commission obtained evidence from police memos that Gauci was made aware from his first contact with investigators that his testimony could be worth MILLIONS.

This contradicted evidence given by Scots and US investigators at Megrahi's trial.

One undisclosed memo reveals the FBI discussed with Scots cops an offer of unlimited cash to Gauci - with "$10,000 available immediately".

If a judge was made aware of this in another case, they'd tell a jury to discount the evidence.

Xmas lights lies

In court Gauci was vague about the exact date on which the clothes were bought.

The date was narrowed to either November 23, 1988, when Megrahi was not on Malta, or December 7, 1988, when he was.

Gauci said Christmas lights were NOT on yet in his hometown Sliema when the suspect visited his shop.

Cops said they could not find out when the lights were switched on.

But the SCCRC easily established it was December 6 - a day too early for Megrahi to have been the buyer.

The commission's report says: "It is clear that the police were in no doubt that Gauci was clear in his recollection." It adds "no reasonable court" could have concluded Megrahi bought the clothes from Gauci's shop.

Defence in the dark

It appears efforts were made to cover up key evidence that would have been useful for Megrahi's defence team.

The commission noted that early uncertainty on the part of Gauci was never passed over to the defence, nor was the fact that Scots detectives feared he was trying too hard to please them.

The fact a senior Maltese detective also considered Gauci to be an unreliable witness was never disclosed to lawyers representing Megrahi.

Evidence supressed

The SCCRC claims Colin Boyd QC, who was Lord Advocate at the time of Megrahi's trial and conviction in 2001, suppressed key evidence.

The trial judges maintained Gauci was "entirely reliable" on the list of clothing he claimed the buyer suspect purchased.

Yet a statement he made in 1999, and discovered by the SCCRC, saw him produce "a wholly different list of items and prices". This, along with many other files that could damage the Crown case, was suppressed. The report says Mr Boyd failed in his duty of disclosure to the defence.

Highest Bayesian probability of Megrahi guilt 23 per cent

[Two highly important articles have recently been posted on the website Three Sides to Every Story. The first is headed Why the Lockerbie bomb was loaded at Heathrow and Megrahi was innocent. The first two paragraphs and the last paragraph of the lengthy piece read as follows:]

It is slightly shocking that Morag Kerr's book, which gives the first ever convincing, evidence-based reconstruction of the Lockerbie bombing, has not been reviewed in a major UK-wide newspaper since coming out in December.

She completely rebuts the case which was pressed by the Crown and accepted by the Camp Zeist court against the late Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, a Libyan agent, who served [8] years in prison in Scotland after conviction.  She also shows how the crime was really committed: not by Megrahi loading the suitcase with the bomb at Malta, to be transferred at Frankfurt onto the plane to Heathrow that was set to go on to New York City, before detonating over Scotland, but rather by persons unknown spiriting the suitcase onto the plane at Heathrow by placing it in a luggage shed ready to go directly on board Pan Am 103 to New York City. (...)

You will have to read the book and judge the forensic complexities for yourself.  For my part, I am convinced that Kerr is the first person to accurately reconstruct the Lockerbie bombing.  It was a crime perpetrated at Heathrow, and an innocent man suffered for it.  It is a textbook case of a miscarriage of justice, featuring leads missed by the police, unfeasible reconstructions of events and incompetent experts, as well as misconstrued, unreliable evidence both material and eye-witness.  The judges constructed a circumstantial case by irrationally explaining away key exculpatory evidence.  Kerr's book is not only a triumph of critical, evidence-based investigation, but also an instructive example of how a miscarriage of justice can occur.

[The second article is headed Bayesian probability analysis of the guilty verdict against Megrahi for the Lockerbie bombing. The first two paragraph read as follows:]

In my first post about the Lockerbie bombing, I discussed Morag Kerr's book reconstructing the commission of the Lockerbie bombing and demonstrating the innocence of the convicted man, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi.  In common with most humanistic reasoning, neither the verdict that condemned him nor Kerr's argument for his exoneration deployed any arithmetic of probability in analysing the evidence.  I think the widespread lack of arithmetical analysis of evidence is a serious weakness in fields like criminal law and history.

In this, I am following Richard Carrier in his book Proving History.  I am persuaded by him that we ought not just to use adjectives like "possible" and "probable" when we debate which theories best explain the evidence before us on a contentious historical or forensic question.  Additionally, we should use Bayes' Theorem: using numbers to express our opinions, and multiplying and dividing them according to Bayes' formula in order to calculate our reckoning of which theory explains the evidence the best.  The three main virtues of Bayes' Theorem are that it forces the analyst of evidence to specify clearly how good they think a theory is at explaining the evidence; it enables them to put all the evidence together in a mathematically sound way; and, above all, it forces them to look for evidence that supports their theory better than alternative theories, thus helping them to overcome the common failure to give alternatives due consideration.  Of course, different people can have different opinions about probabilities: the virtue of Bayes is that it brings out exactly what people agree and disagree about, and thus focuses their debate productively on crucial areas of disagreement.

[The author then subjects the evidence against Megrahi to Bayesian probability analysis and concludes that the highest probability of guilt that the judges should have arrived at was 23% and concludes:]

The judges failed to use Bayesian reasoning, which would have shown them that, far from a series of improbabilities adding up to a proof of Megrahi's guilt, they should have multiplied them out to a much greater sense of doubt.  They failed to appreciate that the crime was such an unlikely one on principle, that iron-clad evidence of Megrahi's guilt was required to overcome the prior improbability: extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.  A circumstantial case built on improbabilities does not cut it.

If the judges had applied correct probabilistic reasoning to the facts they did have about an unaccompanied bag from Warsaw, then this would have neutralised the evidence of an unaccompanied bag coming from Malta.

Of course, if we included the evidence explained yesterday, and considered how probable it was, on a hypothesis of Megrahi's guilt, that a mysterious suitcase answering to the description of the bomb-case would be seen by a baggage-handler at Heathrow before the feeder flight from Frankfurt had even arrived, then it would only be fair to divide the 23% we have come to here by maybe 10 times, if not more.  Include all the evidence, and the probability of guilt is minimal.

Moreover, include a more realistic expectation of the probability of getting the bomb into the baggage system at Malta, and the probability drops again to a minuscule number.

In sum, even without the new understanding born of Kerr's investigation, Megrahi should not have been found guilty. With it, his innocence is proven.

Thus the worst mass-murder in British history, the killing of 270 people, should be regarded as an unsolved crime.

Utterly incompetent and shameful

What follows is an item originally posted on this blog on this date two years ago:

Lockerbie bomber’s cancer ‘a gift from God’ for Scottish government

[This is the headline over a long report on the Megrahi keynote session at the Edinburgh International Book Festival in today’s edition of The Malta Independent on Sunday. It reads in part:]

The cancer that killed Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, the only man convicted for the Lockerbie bombing, was a “gift from God” to establishments with something to hide, according to the Libyan’s biographer.

John Ashton made the claim last Saturday at the Edinburgh International Book Festival, which also featured other high-profile critics of the controversial case.

Megrahi died from prostate cancer in May in Libya after being released from prison in Scotland in 2009 on compassionate grounds.

Ashton said this week: “Megrahi’s cancer was a gift from God for everybody involved that had something to hide. It allowed his release, it allowed the final stages of the rapprochement between the UK and Libya, and it allowed the Scottish government to allow him out of prison on a legal basis that wasn’t one laid down by the hated government in Westminster.”

The course of events was a “political fix”, he told the audience at the venue in Charlotte Square, Edinburgh.

“It was a tragedy for Megrahi but I think everybody else was punching the air.”

He added: “The judges got it wrong, for whatever reason, and the Crown Office withheld evidence.

“I’m sure they did so in good faith but their behaviour was utterly incompetent and shameful.”

Hans Köchler, the UN observer at the trial in the Netherlands, told the audience he could not understand why Megrahi was found guilty but his alleged co-conspirator was not.

Claiming that the trial was politically motivated, Köchler said: “Eight senior Scottish judges got it wrong, but the question is why? It is not because of a lack of intellectual skills.”

The cover of the biography, Megrahi: You are my Jury, carries a quote from Megrahi saying: “I know that I’m innocent. Here, for the first time, is my true story: how I came to be blamed for Britain’s worst mass murder, my nightmare decade in prison and the truth about my controversial release. Please read it and decide for yourself. You are now my jury.”

Jim Swire, who lost his daughter in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103, was also present at the event. Swire demonstrated his anger and frustration surrounding the case, speaking of his meeting earlier this year with the Lord Advocate who claimed did not know why evidence was withheld by the Crown Office in the original trial, specifically the evidence surrounding a break-in at Heathrow airport around the time Pan Am Flight 103 took off from London.

Swire believes that a bomb was taken on board in London.

“During the whole trial we did not know that Heathrow airport had been broken into 16 hours before Lockerbie happened, it seemed to me very likely that was the technology that had been used,” he said. “The whole concept that the thing came from Malta via Megrahi’s luggage or anyone else’s seemed, to me, far-fetched.” (...)

“What I say is, first and foremost, that the judges got it wrong, for whatever reason, and the Crown Office withheld evidence,” Ashton went on to say.

A permanent stain on Scottish justice

[At the Edinburgh International Book Festival today James Robertson featured at an event entitled What kind of Scotland do we imagine? The following are excerpts from a review on the Literature for Lads website:]

James Robertson was introduced by the Chair of the event and fellow author, Allan Massie as "a distinguished and versatile novelist having written about topics such as slavery, Calvinism and Scottish history… In addition in his latest novel The Professor of Truth he examines the question of truth and what is justice." Over the next hour Robertson gave his views on many of these topics whilst also engaging in interesting debate with both the Chair and members of the audience. 

Robertson opened proceedings by reading a section from The Professor of Truth which featured a discussion between two of the characters and their views on the justice system.  Following this Robertson shared with the audience his belief that the justice system is in many regards flawed.  He believes that in the past '...the truth is not always achieved. Justice has not always been done. This has implications for all of us as Law is fundamental to any society. If it's not working it is a problem for all of us'. Although both Allan Massie and Robertson were keen to point out that The Professor of Truth is a work of fiction it is clearly based on the Lockerbie bombing and the subsequent legal case.

Chair Massie questioned Robertson about the pending appeal in the case of the Lockerbie bomber. "If it's rejected what does it say about Scottish Law?" Robertson believes "there will be a great deal of unfinished business if the outcome is not challenged. Currently it's a permanent stain on Scottish justice. The system has a shadow hanging over it… it's crucial to lay to rest many of the severe doubts people have." (...)

Robertson is an outstanding novelist and respected cultural voice in the world of Scottish politics. Today he shared his views with an interested and animated audience who were keen to engage him in debate and discussion both on his novels and on the impending Scottish referendum. There is no doubt that whatever the outcome of next month's referendum he will continue to remain one of Scotland's leading novelists and cultural commentators.

Murky, contentious and unresolved mystery

[Five years ago this week we were all on tenterhooks waiting for Kenny MacAskill’s decision on the Libyan Government’s application for transfer of Abdelbaset Megrahi to Libya to serve the remainder of his sentence and on Megrahi’s own application for compassionate release in view of his terminal prostate cancer. The following are excerpts from an article by Magnus Linklater published in The Times on 18 August 2009:]

It is hard to overstate the three issues at the heart of the Lockerbie affair. The first is compassion — for a man, who may be innocent, and is dying in prison. The second is justice — the search for truth about a deadly act of terrorism. The third is reputation — the probity and good name of a government seeking to balance all these against the need to do the right thing.

To sacrifice all three in the course of a week, while at the same time emerging as weak, indecisive, secretive and self-serving, is a quite spectacular achievement. Yet that is what the Nationalist administration in Scotland has succeeded in doing in the course of its first important appearance on the international stage. (...)

The years roll by as a lengthy appeal process unwinds, each time attracting an accumulation of doubt as campaigners dig up claim and counterclaim, suggesting that the conviction was unsafe. Meanwhile, the man himself develops prostate cancer and is said to be close to death. The final appeal, his family say, may come too late. (...)

After indicating that he was “minded” to release the bomber on compassionate grounds, Mr MacAskill did something Macchiavelli would certainly have forbidden — he went into prison to see the man himself. Minister and terrorist face to face, a meeting that ensured that Mr MacAskill was no longer at arm’s length from the affair.

What did they say to each other? We do not know. But within days, it emerged that Abdul Baset Ali al-Megrahi would indeed be released on compassionate grounds, and might well be back in Libya within a week — in time for Ramadan.

There were, of course, protests from American relatives, but those had been expected. The case would continue, they were told, even in the absence of the accused. But then, just as we were adjusting to this, the defence team announced that it was dropping his appeal.

This had the immediate effect of alienating not only those who had argued that al-Megrahi should stay in prison, but those who wanted him returned; they had always insisted that the case must go on so that his name would be cleared. The immediate supposition was that a deal had been done in that prison cell, perhaps to prevent embarrassing disclosures in the High Court. As for the rest of us, we mourned that the last chance of getting at the truth of this murky, contentious and unresolved mystery was now lost.

Crown Office and Scottish Government stonewalling

[What follows is a snippet from an interview with Hugh Andrew, founder and managing director of Birlinn, published today on the Herald Scotland website:]

On setbacks to growth, Mr Andrew says: "Every time a book fails it is a setback, there is no legislating for the market. You can produce something you think is the most wonderful book and it bombs."

But there are welcome surprises too, like The Tobermory Cat, one of Birlinn's biggest successes though with the unwelcome surprise of a lawsuit alleging creative ownership of the "concept" of the island's real-live cat. Mr Andrew notes how the inspiring Calum's Road based on Raasay made a significant contribution to island tourism, and says the cat's tale has promoted Tobermory round the world. He says: "We brought out the defence case for Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi and received no legal injunction or comment but the cat has caused me more legal difficulties than anything I have ever published."

[The books published by Birlinn include John Ashton’s Megrahi: You are my Jury (2012) and Scotland’s Shame: Why Lockerbie still matters (2013). It is utterly shameful that the shocking disclosures in these books have provoked no reaction other than stonewalling from the Crown Office and the Scottish Government.]

MH17 and Lockerbie: a view from the Netherlands

[MH17: Netherlands wrestles with huge criminal case is the headline over a report published today on the BBC News website.  It reads in part:]

Two-thirds of the 298 people on board Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 were from the Netherlands. That is why the Dutch have taken the lead in identifying the bodies, trying to establish what caused the crash and running the criminal investigation.

Western governments suspect that the jet, with 298 people on board, was hit by a Russian surface-to-air missile fired by pro-Russian separatists. The rebels and Russia blamed the Ukrainian military for the crash. (...)

This is the biggest criminal investigation ever conducted in the Netherlands.

"Never before have we had a murder case with so many victims," said Wim de Bruin from the Dutch prosecution service, fielding press inquiries from all over the world. Passengers from 10 different countries were on board Flight MH17.

Ten Dutch prosecutors and 200 police officers are involved in gathering and preparing the evidence for a criminal trial.

There are three main questions about the eventual MH17 trial: Where will it be conducted? What crimes will the accused be charged with? How long before we see the suspects in court?

The Dutch prosecutors are still in the initial stages of the criminal investigation, but they have already dismissed speculation that the trial could be held at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

The ICC only takes cases if countries are unable or unwilling to prosecute. The Dutch are willing and able.

Under the current plan, the suspects would be extradited to face trial at the District Court in The Hague. But extradition would require the host country's co-operation, once the suspects are identified.

Wim de Bruin says they are considering "several grounds and possibilities" concerning the charges.

"Of course murder, but we also have the crime of 'wrecking an airplane' and we could use international criminal law - that would mean possible charges of war crimes, torture and genocide." [RB: I find it difficult to envisage how torture and genocide charges could arise in this case.]

It is impossible, they say, to give a time frame. The only reference they have is Lockerbie. Pan Am Flight 103 was blown up over Scotland in 1988, killing 259 people on board and 11 others on the ground. In 2001, a Libyan intelligence officer was jailed for the bombing.

Yet questions remain about the bomb plot - not only the perpetrators but also the motives. In 2003 Col Muammar Gaddafi - later killed in the Arab Spring - accepted responsibility and paid compensation to the victims' families. [RB: The scope of Libya’s acknowledgment was limited to acceptance of “responsibility for the actions of its officials”.]

"With Lockerbie it took three years for the investigation and then another seven for the trial," Mr De Bruin recalls. "And that was with a plane that crashed in a peaceful place. With MH17 the case is more complicated."

[My own assessment of the jurisdictional questions that arise out of MH17 and how they compare with those that arose out of Pan Am 103 can be read here.]

The London origin theory

[This morning, by chance, I rediscovered an article dating from July 2010 headed The London Origin Theory by Caustic Logic on his website The Lockerbie Divide. The leading exposition of this theory is now, of course, to be found in Dr Morag Kerr’s superb book Adequately Explained by Stupidity? Lockerbie, Luggage and Lies. However, Caustic Logic’s piece deserves attention, too. So here it is:]

“I want to know when the bomb was placed on the plane and by whom. We have to look more closely into the "London theory" – that the bomb was placed on the plane at Heathrow and not in Malta.” - Hans Köchler, independent UN observer at Zeist trial, 21 Aug 2009 (Source)

"If I was determined to bring down an airplane, I would have put [the bomb] on in London." - Robert Baer, 'former' CIA agent and weapons expert, who doesn't buy the Libyans-did-it story line.

The London Origin theory has emerged as the most logical explanation for what happened to Pan Am 103 on December 21 1988. The official story, all the most widely-seen revisionist arguments, and even Megrahi's defense team's curious "special defense of incrimination" drew on elements of the drug swap theory, with the bomb coming in from Germany or further afield. Megrahi's counsel William Taylor QC did however give reasons to suspect a  London origin (...) to the trial judges and summarized at trial's end in 2001:  “My submission is that all of the above render the choice of Heathrow a much more likely one [than Malta]. And when that possibility is considered, one finds that there is a compelling body of evidence that points to Heathrow as being the point of ingestion.” [day 82 p9862]

But in the earliest days of the investigation, January and February 1989, British investigators labored to clear Heathrow Airport of any lapses and ensure that the bomb's origin would have to be found elsewhere. Years of confusion ensued... (see "Counter-Arguments" below for more on the dismissal of the London theory).

Direct Evidence For the Theory

Among the first clues came from finding where the plane failed, and what luggage container the blast originated in. Container AVE4041 in forward left cargo hold, position 14L, was decided within a few days. The container's blasted out remains were found and reassembled enough to show the blast was down at the bottom of the container, in the aft outboard corner. It had been in the spot closest to the hull, only 25" from the thin and aged skin of Maid of the seas.

Unfortunately, the exact placement, origin, or even number of suitcases in that box was hard to pin down. Records and witnesses helped decide 4041 was loaded with a few bags (6-8 or so) of (apparently) interline luggage, then filled up with a few dozen cases from the feeder/first leg flight 103A out of Frankfurt. But within this generally imprecise body of memories, one stands out as of amazing possible significance.

The Bedford Suitcase(s)

This was always the hard part to get around in order to reject the initially obvious Heathrow introduction theory. A Pan Am worker mentioned to police right after the attack said he saw two brown hardshell samsonite suitcases, placed on the floor of container 4041. The position of these was side-by-side from the far left of the floor, at the (loading) front of the container. If the bags had been later stacked one on the other and the top bag slid a few inches left, it would be in the perfect spot to match the explosion center - aft outboard corner, second suitcase from the bottom - where just such case detonated.

An amazing lead, investigators almost seem to have tried to not follow this one.  Since the cases Bedford saw were on the floor when he saw them, and the blast seemed to have happened one layer up from that, they decided these cases were a coincidence. They must have been moved across the container, and replaced in that lower corner with an identical case from Germany, on top of some other damaged Frankfurt-originating luggage. The leaps of faith here are simply alarming.

The Bedford story is covered in great detail at this site, with the works so far compiled at the link above.

Break-in Reported

A security guard at heathrow Airport reported a break-in at terminal 3 around 12:30 am on  December 21. Ray Manly's report, of a padlock on the floor "cut like butter" was covered up for over a decade. Even at trial in 2000, the defense was not allowed to know of this. Manly came forward in 2001 with the story, soon verified by the long-suppressed police reports. (...)

Mentioned in: Appeal Court Dismissal of the Heathrow Theory

Circumstantial Evidence For the Theory

The 38-Minute Coincidence

Aside from its crew and perhaps some cargo that (probably) doesn't matter here, the 747 Clipper Maid of the Seas landed empty at London's Heathrow airport mid-day December 21, 1988. There the plane took on a load of 243 passengers and their luggage, and took off at 6:25pm for New York as Pan Am Flight 103. Clearly, the bomb went on the plane at London, but the question that comes quickly behind it is where did it come from before that? A van in the parking lot, or another plane?

Such clues were vital to tracking down the perpetrators, and should be embraced when they're found. The time of explosion itself is a valuable clue - 38 minutes after leaving the ground - is a known hallmark of the altimeter bombs made just weeks earlier by terrorist bomb-maker and "double agent" Marwan Khreesat. He had produced four altimeter-triggered, radio-disguised bombs, set to detonate less than an hour after takeoff. Each of the others was a bit different, but the one that was captured and tested thoroughly would have blown up about 45-50 minutes after takeoff.  

The timing compatibility with a Khreesat bomb loaded at London notwithstanding, it's been officially decided and legally established that was a Libyan-ordered and set MST-13 timer that told the bomb to go off over Lockerbie. Officially, legally, by the evidence led at trial, it's an asbolute coincidence the timing so resembles the method first suspected.

Operational Security

When confronted with the official story of a Malta-Germany-London, the most obvious averse reaction of those who know air travel operations is to ridicule the notion that an airline bomb would make any sense being trusted to so many switches. Any functional security screen or time delay along the way coulld screw up the whole operation with a timer-based device as alleged. A trip from Frankfurt only is often suggested to replace this, but it too has one too many stops for a Khreesat bomb, and still a high chanced of the bomb being delayed or intercepted. If one could pierce security at any of the three airports, and it obviously happened at one of them, Heathrow would give one the best chance for success and the only way for a Khreesat bomb to have done what happened.   

Former head of security for British Airways, Denis Phipps, The Maltese Double Cross:

“If a device had been infiltrated into the system at Malta, it would have been necessary for that device to have been carried in an aircraft in the sector from Malta to Frankfurt, to have gone through a handling process, been carried on an aircraft through the sector from Frankfurt to Heathrow, and then timed to detonate during the final sector, Heathrow to New York, presumably whilst the aircraft was over the ocean to avoid discovery of forensic evidence …  one has to say, um, are - terrorists  - idiots? Don’t terrorists plan to have a reasonable degree of success?"  

Explosive Efficacy

If one places a device at the airport the target leaves from, rather than remotely through multiple flights, a new possibility is opened up - depending on the nature and depth of his penetration, a determined terrorist could place the bag himself and chose where in the container it went. As it happened, the bomb in PA103 was placed in the best spot (for the terrorists), and one of the few that could have even worked - the lower outboard quadrant, more or less on the sloping floor nearest the hull. Figure F13 (below) of the AAIB's report shows the deduced center of explosion that officially was achieved by accident. Considering even there, all that was blows from the hull was a chunk the size of a dinner plate. That's all it took, but it wouldn't happen at all if the bomb had wound up in the upper inboard corner, or even in the middle.

It is true, as some have pointed out, that there'd be no guarantee any cases placed in that deadly corner would stay there. But terrorists simply can't wait for guarantees. Certainly having it in the right spot, for sure, at one point, is better than relying on pure chance. Perhaps with this in mind, famous former CIA agent Robert Baer, who may have direct experience in this for all we know, has said:

"I used to teach explosives. The last thing you want to do is put a bomb on in a place like Malta and have two stops along the way ... you couldn't count on this thing hitting its target. ... Malta would not have been my first choice. It would have been London. If I was determined to bring down an airplane, I would have put it on in London." Flight into Darkness video, part two, 5:25

Counter Arguments Addressed

Forensics and the Frankfurt Link to the Rescue

UK and Germany had both been unsettled by the possibility their security forces had allowed the horror of Lockerbie to pass through. Some of their early wrangling is addressed in the post "What did the Germans Know?" British investigators decided the blast - 10 inches above the container floor - was above any possible non-Frankfurt luggage and therefore had to be some other brown, hardshell Samsonite from the one(s) Bedford described, that must have been from the feeder 103A. It was unsound reasoning and wishful thinking until the Erac printout emerged months later, showing an item apparently coming from Malta, to PA103, via Frankfurt.

The Malta Link to the Rescue

The Erac printout, emerging months after the attack from an employee's locker after all official copies somehow disappeared, sealed the deal for Malta origin. But the tiny island nation had already been mentioned in the evidence, as the place of manufacture for some of it. As it so happened, the Erac (Frankfurt) printout in August 1989 spurred a closer look, and the clothes were traced to a store on Malta where Tony Gauci was found...

Malta-based Libyan defector Abdul Majid Giaka was already on file with the culprits - Megrahi and Fhimah - that some hoped Tony saw one of. By late February 1991, they had a sort of identification of Megrahi from the shopkeeper.  A few months later, Giaka was finally removed to safety and first mentioned the suitcase - possibly the same model Bedford reported - seen on Malta the day before it reappeared on that dubious printout leaving there. The story is clearly false, but formed one basis of the U.S. indictment against Megrahi and Fhimah in November 1991.

And finally, Air Malta has airtight records that the 55 bags on flight 180 were all claimed by its 39 passengers. They've shown this in court, like in their libel suit against Granada television. How the bomb was sneaked around Air Malta's system was never explained or substantiated even back when Fhimah was accepted as an accomplice. Investigators tried to find evidence of Maltese collusion or corruption or incompetence, but came up only with 'well, they must have done it somehow.' After the dismissal of Giaka's Malta stories, the Zeist judges  found that accomplice not guilty, further complicating the feat for Megrahi. They admit it's hard to see just how he did it, but he must have. Guilty.